


United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge	SUZANNE B. CONLON	Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge	
CASE NUMBER	10 C 7544	DATE	12/9/2010
CASE TITLE	Enrique Hernandez (#R-74552) vs. The City of Chicago		

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The plaintiff's motion for leave to file *in forma pauperis* [#3] is granted. However, the complaint is dismissed on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state an actionable claim. The case is terminated. The plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [#4] is denied as moot. The trust fund officer at the plaintiff's place of confinement is authorized and ordered to make deductions from the plaintiff's account and payments to the clerk of court in accordance with this order. The clerk is directed to mail a copy of this order to the trust fund officer at the Pontiac Correctional Center. This dismissal counts as one of the plaintiff's three allotted dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).



Docketing to mail notices.

■ [For further details see text below.]

STATEMENT

The plaintiff, a state prisoner, has brought this *pro se* civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that Chicago police officers conducted an unreasonable interrogation, as well as subjected the plaintiff to sleep deprivation and inhumane conditions, following his August 2006 arrest.

The court finds that the plaintiff is unable to prepay the filing fee. Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* and assesses an initial partial filing fee of \$5.67 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The trust fund officer at the plaintiff's place of incarceration is authorized and ordered to collect, when funds exist, the partial filing fee from the plaintiff's trust fund account and pay it directly to the clerk of court. Thereafter, the trust fund officer at the plaintiff's place of confinement is directed to collect monthly payments from the plaintiff's trust fund account in the amount of 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the account. Monthly payments shall be forwarded to the clerk of court each time the account balance exceeds \$10 until the full \$350 filing fee is paid. Separate deductions and payments shall be made with respect to each action or appeal filed by the plaintiff. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier's Desk, 20th Floor, and shall clearly identify the plaintiff's name and this case number.

(CONTINUED)

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STATEMENT (continued)

However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court is required to dismiss a suit brought *in forma pauperis* at any time if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Here, even accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the court finds that the complaint fails to state an actionable claim as a matter of law.

The plaintiff's claims are time-barred. In Illinois, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is two years. *See, e.g., Dominguez v. Hendley*, 545 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 2008); 735 ILCS § 5/13-202. Illinois law does not toll the statute of limitations for prisoners. *Schweihs Burdick*, 96 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. 1996); *Turner-El v. Davis*, No. 10 C 5188, 2010 WL 3526379, *1, n.1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2010) (Norgle, J.). Expiration of a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, but "when the existence of a valid affirmative defense is so plain from the face of the complaint that the suit can be regarded as frivolous, the district judge need not wait for an answer before dismissing the suit." *Walker v. Thompson*, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, the plaintiff is suing over events that took place on August 27, 28 and 29, 2006, well over four years ago. Accordingly, any federal cause of action has expired. It would therefore be futile to amend the complaint to name the actual officers who are accused of mistreating the plaintiff. *See Worthington v. Wilson*, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1993); *see also Wood v. Worachek*, 618 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1980) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) does not permit a plaintiff to replace John Doe defendants with named defendants after the statute of limitations has expired).

The plaintiff does not contend that he confessed under duress, or was otherwise coerced into making incriminating statements. The court makes no finding as to whether the plaintiff may be entitled to relief under habeas corpus. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court is not permitted to "convert" a civil rights action into a habeas corpus suit and decide the case on its merits. *Pischke v. Litscher*, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). Rather, "[i]t should simply be dismissed, leaving to the prisoner to decide whether to refile it as a petition for habeas corpus." *Id.* The plaintiff should carefully review 28 U.S.C. § 2254, along with its accompanying exhaustion and timeliness requirements, prior to initiating a habeas action.

For the foregoing reasons, this suit is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiff is warned that if a prisoner has had a total of three federal cases or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim, he may not file suit in federal court without prepaying the filing fee unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

If the plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal *in forma pauperis* should set forth the issues the plaintiff plans to present on appeal. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If the plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the \$455 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. *Evans v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections*, 150 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, if the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, the plaintiff may also accumulate another "strike."

